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Seligson: Insurance

Insurance
by Robert A. Seligson*
Any discussion of California insurance decisions and developments in the past year must perforce start with the fall of
1966, since 1967 was the year in which the insurance industry
was confronted with greatly expanded rules on the duty to
defend, the duty to settle within limits and rising above all,
like a Colossus sprung from the deep, the tortured decision
of Pacific Employers Insurance Company v. Maryland Casualty Company, 1 which threatened to convert policies written
for totally different purposes into automobile liability policies
at the drop of a hat and with nary a premium.

The Duty to Defeud
The duty to defend was the first field to occupy the attention
of the supreme court; the battleground was the case of Gray
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1. 65 Cal.2d 318, 54 Cal. Rptr. 385,
419 P.2d 641 (1966).
CAL LAW 1967
127

1

insurance

Cal Law Trends and Developments, Vol. 1967, Iss. 1 [1967], Art. 7

v. Zurich Insurance Company.2 Dr. Gray, while driving his
automobile, almost had a collision with an automobile operated by Jones. Jones "approached Dr. Gray's car in a menacing manner and jerked open the door,,;3 and Dr. Gray then
struck Jones. "Jones filed a complaint alleging that Gray
." Gray's
'willfully and intentionally assaulted' him.
insurer, Zurich, refused to defend Gray, since its policy excluded ".
bodily injury or property damages caused
intentionally by or at the direction of the insured."4 Gray
unsuccessfully defended the case on the theory of self-defense;
there was a judgment of $6,000 actual damages, but no
punitive damages. Gray then sued Zurich, claiming a breach
of its duty to defend. The trial court rendered judgment for
Zurich; the supreme court reversed and remanded the case
to the trial court to take evidence solely on the issue of damages alleged in the complaint, including the amount of the
judgment in the Jones suit and the costs, expenses and attorneys' fees incurred in defending that action.
The court held that an insurance carrier must defend a
suit that potentially seeks damages within the coverage of the
policy and ruled that in determining whether an exclusionary
clause in an insurance policy will be applied, the question is
whether the insured might reasonably expect the insurer to
defend him. The court indicated that an insurer refuses to
defend only at its peril and stated that the remedy for a
carrier, which feels that there is no coverage under the policy,
is to defend on a reservation of right basis and to raise the
noncoverage defense in a subsequent action afterwards, if the
injured party prevails in his action against the insured. Notwithstanding the exclusion in the policy, the court held that
the insurer was required to pay not only the costs of defense,
but also the judgment against its insured, apparently on the
basis that the insurer has more money than the insured and
can better afford to employ competent counsel to defend
the case against the insured.
2. 65 Cal.2d 263, 54 Cal. Rptr. 104,
419 P.2d 168 (1966).
3. 65 Cal.2d at 267 n. 1, 54 Cal.
Rptr. at 106 n. 1, 419 P.2d at 170 n. 1.
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The opinion contained considerable dictum that indicates
the court's basic attitude toward complicated language and
the use of "fine print" in insurance policies. The court
terms an insurance policy an "adhesion contract" and stated
that obligations arising from such a contract inure not only
from the consensual transaction but from the relationship of
the parties. Thus, the duty to defend depends not merely
on the objective standard of the language in the policy, but
rather on the subjective standard whether the insured might
reasonably expect that he is entitled to a defense.
Lowell v. Maryland Casualty Company5 also involved the
duty to defend under a comprehensive liability policy. Here
too the insurer refused to defend an action that alleged that
the insured unlawfully and maliciously assaulted the plaintiff,
on the basis that its policy provided that an assault and battery would be deemed an accident ". . . unless committed
by or at the direction of the insured."6 The insured prevailed
in the assault and battery action and then sued the insurer
for costs, expenses, and attorneys' fees incurred in defending
that suit. The supreme court reversed the lower court's judgment for the insurer and instructed the trial court to take
evidence solely on the issue of damages. The court rejected,
however, the insured's claim for recovery of attorneys' fees
incurred in the action against the insurer, Maryland Casualty
Company, stating that it saw no more reason for allowing
plaintiff to recover attorneys' fees in this case than in actions
for enforcement of other kinds of rights.
In Stolte, Inc. v. Seaboard Surety Company,7 Seaboard had
paid judgments to persons injured as a result of the use of
a crane by Stolte, lessee of the crane from Seaboard's insured.
Seaboard then sued Stolte on a theory of implied indemnity
and on a "hold harmless" agreement that appeared in the
lease. Stolte cross complained, claiming that Seaboard was
required to provide coverage and defense to the lessee as an
"additional insured." The court held that even though Sea5. 65 Cal.2d 298, 54 Cal. Rptr. 116,
419 P.2d 180 (1966).
6. 65 Cal.2d at 301, 54 Cal. Rptr. at
118, 419 P.2d at 182.
9
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board would be required to provide coverage and defense for
Stolte for any liability imposed by way of implied indemnity,
if that cause of action were dismissed, Seaboard could maintain its action on the "hold harmless" agreement.
The supreme court's decision in Gray v. Zurich was motivated by the court's concern over cases where insurers have
refused to defend claims that might potentially fall within the
terms of their coverage. Because of this concern and the
court's conception of an insurance policy as a public service
contract, the court ignored the exclusion provision of the contract, which on its face would seem to have covered the situation presented by the jury's verdict of bodily injury caused
intentionally by the insured. The subjective standard announced by the court in determining the duty to defend is one
that, by its very nature and emphasis upon the reasonableness
of the expectation of the insured, will unquestionably force
insurers into taking over defenses that would previously have
been rejected on a denial of coverage. On balance, the writer
believes that the court's decision will have a decidedly salutary
effect. The writer, however, does not feel that the court fully
appreciates the conflict of interest problems that can and do
arise under such situations, and he is concerned about the
misuse and misapplication of the court's decision by parties
seeking to obtain insurance coverage and defense for actions
that clearly fall without the scope of the coverage. For example, the writer has already observed tenders of defense to
insurers made by parties charged with attempted murder,
attempted rape and libel. If the insurer is required to defend
these and every other kind of criminal and intentional activity
on the part of its insureds, there will have to be a redefinition
of the concept of insurance and a corresponding adjustment
in the rate of premium that must be borne by the pUblic.

The Duty to Settle Within Limits
As broad and sweeping as the court's decision was concerning the duty to defend, it was matched by the rules set forth
in Crisci v. Security Insurance Company,S involving the duty
8. 66 Cal.2d 425, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13,
426 P.2d 173 (1967).
130
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of a liability insurer to settle a claim against its insured within
policy limits. The supreme court held therein that the test
for determining whether an insurer considered its insured's
interests, before rejecting an offer to settle a claim against
the insured, is whether a prudent insurer without policy limits
would have accepted the settlement offer. It is not necessary
to show that the insurer has in any way been guilty of actual
dishonesty, fraud, or concealment. Liability is imposed on the
insurer for failure to meet its duty to accept reasonable settlements, a duty included within the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing. The size of the judgment recovered
in the personal injury action, when it exceeds the policy limits,
although not conclusive, furnishes an inference that the value
of the claim is the equivalent of the amount of the judgment
and that acceptance of an offer within those limits was the
most reasonable method of dealing with the claim. The court
held that the evidence supported a finding of the defendant's
breach of duty to consider plaintiff's interest in proposed settlements and that the defendant's alleged belief that the claimant
had no chance of recovery for mental suffering could be found
to be unreasonable. The facts supporting this reasoning are
that it appeared that defendant's attorney and the claims manager agreed that an award, if any, to the claimant for psychosis
would be at least ten times the policy limits; that the defendant
knew that the claimant's accident could have caused psychosis;
and that reputable psychiatrists supported the claim. The
insurer had rejected a $9,000 settlement demand at a time
when its insured offered to pay $2,500 towards settlement.
The insurer was only willing to pay $3,000 for the plaintiff's
physical injuries and was unwilling to pay anything for the
possibility of a plaintiff's verdict on the mental illness issue.
The policy limit was $10,000 and the ensuing plaintiff's
verdict was for $100,000.
The significant portion of the court's decision concerns the
argument by an amicus curiae that whenever an insurer receives an offer to settle within the policy limits and rejects
it, the insurer should be liable in every case for the amount
of any final judgment whether or not within the policy limits.
CAL LAW 1967
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In considering this argument, Justice Peters, speaking for the
court, stated:
Obviously, it will always be in the insured's interest to
settle within the policy limits when there is any danger,
however slight, of a judgment in excess of those limits.
Accordingly the rejection of a settlement within the limits
where there is any danger of a judgment in excess of the
limits can be justified, if at all, only on the basis of interests of the insurer, and, in light of the common knowledge
that settlement is one of the usual methods by which an
insured receives protection under a liability policy, it may
not be unreasonable for an insured who purchases a
policy with limits to believe that a sum of money equal
to the limits is available and will be used so as to avoid
liability on his part with regard to any covered accident.
In view of such expectation an insurer should not be permitted to further its own interests by rejecting opportunities to settle within the policy limits unless it is also willing to absorb losses which may result from its failure to
settle. 9
The court noted that the proposed rule of strict liability is a
simple one to apply and avoids the burdens of a determination
whether a settlement offer within the policy limits was reasonable. It further stated that the proposed rule would also eliminate the danger that an insurer, faced with a settlement offer
at or near the policy limits, will reject the offer and gamble
with the insured's money to further its own interests. Finally,
the court noted that it is not entirely clear that the proposed
rule would place a burden on insurers substantially greater
than that which is present under existing law. Considering
Justice Peters' decision in this case, there seems to be some
truth in the latter statement. One wonders whether the insurance industry will not have to raise their minimum limits to
a level sufficient to compensate for the danger of excess judgments.
9. 66 Cal.2d at 430-31,58 Cal. Rptr.
at 17, 426 P.2d at 177.
132
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The court also held that the insured was entitled to damages
from her insurer for her mental suffering caused by virtue
of the insurer's failure to settle the case within limits. The
court held that an action against an insurer based upon its
alleged bad faith sounds both in contract and in tort and,
therefore, the plaintiff may avail himself of the rules of compensation in tort cases and may recover for mental suffering
occasioned by the tortious conduct of the insurer in failing
to settle within the policy limits. One who loses his property
and suffers mental distress as a result of another's tortious
conduct may recover not only for the pecuniary loss but also
for his mental distress. This is justified on the basis that
among the considerations in purchasing liability insurance is
the peace of mind and security it will provide in the event
of accidental loss.
It would seem that the result in Crisci was warranted by
the facts presented therein since the insurance company did
not act reasonably. However, the implications and dangers
presented by the court's decision are again considerable. For
example, take the situation of a drunken pedestrian who walks
out into the street in the middle of the block between two
parked cars directly into the path of a motorist, who though
traveling within the speed limit, is unable to avoid the accident. The pedestrian is seriously and permanently injured,
and the motorist has a minimum limits policy. Must the
insurer of the innocent motorist offer to settle the claim for
the policy limits in order to avoid the possibility that the
plaintiff's severe injuries may induce the jury to render a
substantial verdict? If a reasonable individual would not
have succumbed to the threat of a large verdict, then the
writer does not believe that a reasonable insurer that has
followed the same course of action should be held strictly
liable for a judgment in excess of limits.
General Comprehensive Liability Policy: Automobile Coverage
The results in Gray and Crisci may be justified on the basis
that serious problems require dramatic solutions. However,
the same may not be said of the court's decision in Pacific
CAL LAW 1967
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Employers Insurance Company v. Maryland Casualty Company,10 which the writer believes to be the worst insurance
law decision to be rendered by the court in many years.
In Pacific Employers, the court, relying on California Vehicle
Code section 16451 11 and Wildman v. Government Employees
Insurance Company/2 held that a general comprehensive liability policy afforded automobile coverage for an accident
that occurred away from the premises of the named insured
and that the policy was required to afford coverage to a permISSIve user. The case involved an accident that happened
in 1959 during a loading operation at the Libby plant. Pacific
insured the truck that was being loaded. American Mutual,
a defendant, had a comprehensive general liability policy on
the lessor of the forklift that was being used by Libby employees in the loading operation. The American policy did not
purport to cover permissive users and excluded liability
arising from the ownership or operation of "automobiles while
away from the premises
or the ways immediately
adjoining."13 The court held that the phrase "ways immediately adjoining" was ambiguous and that where a policy
provided for coverage of liability arising out of a "substantial"
use of the public ways by an insured's automobile, California
Vehicle Code section 16451 required coverage "within the
continental limits of the United States"14 and the statute in
10. 65 Ca1.2d 318, 54 Cal. Rptr. 385,
419 P.2d 641 (1966).
11. Cal. Vehicle Code § 16451: "An
owner's policy of liability insurance shall
[1] insure the person named therein and
any other person, as insured, using any
[2] owned motor vehicle with the express or implied permission of said assured, against loss from the liability imposed by law for damages arising out
of ownership, maintenance, or use of
such motor vehicle within the continental limits of the United States to the extent and aggregate amount, exclusive of
interest and costs, with respect to each
motor vehicle, of ten thousand dollars
($10,000) for bodily injury to or death
134

of each person as a result of anyone
accident and, subject to said limit as to
one person, the amount of twenty thousand dollars ($20,000) for bodily injury
to or death of all persons as a result of
anyone accident and the amount of five
thousand dollars ($5,000) for damage to
property of others as a result of anyone
accident." [Emphasis in original.]
12. 48 CaI.2d 31, 307 P.2d 359
(1957).
13. 65 Cal.2d at 325, 54 Cal. Rptr.
at 388-89, 419 P.2d at 644-45.
14. 65 Cal.2d at 323, 54 Cal. Rptr.
at 388, 419 P.2d at 644.
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the Wildman case, supra, required coverage for permissive
users. The court stated:
In the instant case there is no question but that the
forklift is expressly covered, at least as to some operations including its use on 'ways immediately adjoining'
the insured's premises. In construing the policy in light
of this phrase we do not deem it relevant that the policy
be categorized as an 'automobile' or any other type
policy. The label is unimportant. What is important is
whether the policy, whatever its label, provides liability
coverage to automobiles while operated on a public highway. If so, then the carrier has exposed itself to the
application of the Wildman principle by purporting to
furnish the crucial coverage. 15

It is interesting to note that in deciding the question of the
duty to defend in Gray v. Zurich, the court placed great stress
and importance on the label of the policy. In this case, one
month later, the court held that the label was unimportant.
In the aftermath of this decision, numerous claims have
been made that homeowners' policies; owners', landlords',
and tenants' policies; and other such policies containing personal liability endorsements and offering what was thought
to be limited automobile coverage for the "premises and the
ways immediately adjoining" are, by virtue of the legal legerdemain utilized in the Pacific Employers decision, converted
into automobile policies furnishing coverage for accidents
occurring miles away from the insured's premises. Confronted by the possibility that their policies might be interpreted to be automobile policies, some insurers have deleted
the coverage that was previously furnished to insureds without additional cost. The public is confused, since it cannot conceive how a homeowners' policy can be held to be
an automobile policy. Yet, if the court's decision in Pacific
Employers is applied literally, the personal liability endorsement contained as a part of the standard homeowners' policy
could be found to afford automobile coverage without con15. 65 Cal.2d at 325-26, 54 Cal.
Rptr. at 389, 419 P.2d at 645.
CAL LAW 1967
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sideration having been given to this exposure from an underwriting standpoint.
It should be noted that in 1963, the requirements of the
Financial Responsibility Laws, including California Vehicle
Code section 16451, were amended so as to apply only to
certified policies. Inasmuch as the court's decision rested
in part on the requirement in section 16451 of coverage for
the "continental limits of the United States," it would seem
that the decision no longer applies to cases where the policy
was issued and the accident occurred after September 20,
1963. At the present time, several superior court decisions
have already drawn this distinction; and unquestionably the
point will be decided in the near future by the appellate courts.
The first appellate court limitation of Pacific Employers
was handed down in the case of Home Indemnity Company
v. Mission Insurance Company.I6 In that case, Home had
issued a comprehensive liability policy which afforded "Automobile" coverage under Coverage A, and "Except Auto."
coverage under Coverage B. Because of various endorsements, the court held that the automobile coverage, Coverage
A, did not apply. Mission claimed that Coverage B of
the Home policy afforded automobile liability coverage on
the basis of the decision in the Pacific Employers case. The
B coverage in the Home policy contained the standard clause
that stated that the policy did not apply to the use of "automobiles if the accident occurs away from such premises or
the ways immediately adjoining.»l7 The court held that where
the policy purports to cover automobile liability in one part
and general liability in another, the application of the Pacific
Employers case would serve to rewrite the policy to the
exclusion of the specific provisions that were applicable to
the automobile coverage. The court could not find any
authority for such procedure, and it refused to apply the
Pacific Employers case to the Home policy.
The writer does not believe that there is any sound basis
for distinguishing the Home case from the situation where one
16. 251 Cal. App.2d 942, 60 Cal.
Rptr. 544 (1967).
136
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company has issued both an automobile policy and a homeowners' policy to the same insured. Nor should there be any
true distinction between the situation where two different
companies have written the automobile and homeowners'
policies. The rationale should be the same, since the insured
has taken out the automobile policy to protect against automobile accidents, and the homeowners' policy for an entirely
different purpose. In Gray v. Zurich, the court indicated
that the reasonable expectation of the parties was important.
Clearly, the individual who has paid a nominal premium for
personal liability coverage under a homeowners' policy should
not reasonably expect that he has purchased automobile liability insurance for accidents occurring away from the premises.
Life Insurance: "Good Health" Provisions
During the past year, the supreme court decided two cases
that substantially affect the interpretation of "good health"
provisions contained in the applications for life insurance
policies. These cases are Metropolitan Life Insurance Company v. Devore I8 and Harte v. United Benefit Life Insurance
Company.I9 In the Metropolitan case, after the insured executed his application for life insurance, which contained a
"good health" provision, and completed a medical questionnaire, his private physician discovered that he had arteriosclerotic heart disease. The insured was not told of his
condition but was hospitalized for rest for a few days, after
which he continued his normal activities until his death over
2 years later. Approximately 1 month after he got out of the
hospital, the policy was delivered to him, at which time he
signed an "Application Amendment," which purported to
ratify the statements in the original application as of the date
of the amended application. The court held that the amended
application was ambiguously worded and was reasonably
understood by the insured to mean that by signing, he was
confirming the statements therein as of the date of the original
18. 66 Cal.2d 129, 56 Cal. Rptr. 881,
424 P.2d 321 (1967).
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application, not the date of the amended one. Furthermore,
the court held that a "good health" provision does not bar
recovery where the applicant believes in good faith that his
health has not materially changed between the time of application and delivery. The insured cannot be charged with
the uncommunicated knowledge of a third person, such as
his physician. He cannot prevail, however, when a disease
predated the application, if the latent condition had become
manifest before delivery and he had knowledge of the seriousness of his condition.
In the Harte case, after the execution of the application for
life insurance, but before delivery of the policy, the insured's
doctor discovered that the insured had inoperable cancer.
The insured's wife was informed, but he was not. He was
told that he had an obstruction of the bowel but that only
minor surgery would be required to remove it, that a biopsy
taken was negative, and that the obstruction would be removed
and he would "be all right." The court restated the rule set
forth in Metropolitan and held that although the insured's
wife was her husband's agent for the purpose of accepting
the policy, her uncommunicated knowledge was not imputed
to her husband for the purpose of determining whether he
acted in good faith, since his good faith had to be determined
on the basis of whether he had actual knowledge. Moreover,
the court held that there was no evidence to indicate that
the agent (the wife) was guilty of fraud to be charged to the
principal (the husband), since she had not read the application and could have been led to believe that liability on
the policy was conditioned only on medical approval of the
insurer's examining physician.
There was also an interesting court of appeal decision in
the life insurance field, involving concurring causes of injury.
In Shafer v. American Casualty Company,20 the defendant's
policy provided that it would pay for the death of the insured
through accidental means but excluded coverage for death·
resulting from "disease." The insured had an automobile
20. 245 Cal. App.2d 1, 53 Cal. Rptr.
446 (1966).
138
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accident that caused a bruise on his arm and shock. At the
time of the accident, he had a preexisting condition of arteriosclerosis in his coronary arteries. He died 2 days after the
accident from a heart attack caused by coronary thrombosis.
The court held that the death was caused by a concurrence
of the shock sustained in the accident and the arteriosclerosis.
Judgment for plaintiff was affirmed on appeal. The court
held that the presence of a preexisting disease or infirmity
will not relieve the insurer from liability if the accident is
the proximate cause of death. Recovery may be had even
though a diseased or an in firmed condition appears to have
contributed to the cause of the death, if the accident sets in
progress the chain of events leading directly to death, or if
the accident is the prime or moving cause of the death.

(;roup Iusurance
The growth of group insurance obtained by employers
for their employees has resulted in increasing litigation. During the past year, two significant decisions were rendered
by the California Supreme Court in this field. In Elfstrom
v. New York Life Insurance Company/ the court held that
the employer acts as the agent of the insurer in performing
the duties of administering group insurance policies. In filling
out an employee's application and certificate for group insurance and inserting misstatements contained therein as to the
employee's eligibility for coverage, the employer and its representative in charge of administering the group insurance
policy were held to be agents of the insurer. The employer's
errors in administration were therefore attributable to the
insurer. The court noted, however, that an insurer may avoid
a policy where the insured misrepresents material facts in the
application to the insurer.
In Walker v. Occidental Life Insurance Company,2 the
court held that an insurer issuing a group insurance policy, to
which is attached the privilege of converting to individual
insurance within a stated period from the termination of
1. 67 Ca1.2d - , 63 Ca1. Rptr. 35,
432 P.2d 731 (1967).

2. 67 Ca1.2d 526, 63 Cal. Rptr. 45,
432 P.2d 741 (1967).
CAL LAW 1967

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1967

13~

13

insurance
Cal Law Trends and
Developments, Vol. 1967, Iss. 1 [1967], Art. 7

employment, is required to give the employee-insured notice
of such termination either directly or through its employeragent. Although the insurer may delegate this task to the
employer, it may not avoid the responsibility for notification
simply by routine reliance on a bookkeeping entry of the
termination date in the employer's record.
An insurer's wrongful rejection of a dismissed employee's
application to convert $10,000 of his $22,000 group life
insurance into individual insurance, did not, on the insured's
death shortly thereafter, however, entitle his beneficiary to the
full $22,000 benefit. Although the prompt rejection of the
smaller application under the mistaken belief that it was
untimely would have made it futile for the insured, before
the conversion period in fact expired to apply for the full
amount available for conversion, there was no evidence that
he intended or desired to do so. The beneficiary was therefore entitled only to $10,000, less the insurance premiums
that would have been payable had the application been
granted.
The Duty of the Insured to Cooperate With the Insurer
In Campbell v. Allstate Insurance Company,3 the supreme
court had held that prejudice was no longer presumed from
an insured's refusal to cooperate with his insurer; and so
it was claimed that under that decision, it was not necessary
to cooperate with Allstate. In 1967 the court of appeal
decided a case which demonstrated that this was not true.
In Allstate Insurance Company v. King,4 Allstate's insured,
who was the defendant in a personal injury action, appeared
at his deposition but failed to appear at the trial. The jury
rendered a verdict in favor of plaintiff. Allstate then brought
a declaratory relief action, and the court affirmed the judgment, declaring that the company was not obligated to pay
the judgment against its insured, since the insured had
breached the cooperation clause of the policy by his failure
to attend the trial. The evidence indicated numerous unsuc3. 60 Cal.2d 303, 32 Cal. Rptr. 827,
384 P.2d 155 (1963).
140
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cess£ul attempts to Ibcate the insured as well as expert testimony by three well-qualified trial lawyers who testified that
the defense would be substantially prejudiced by the absence
of the defendant, particularly where no reasonable excuse
could be offered for his absence.

Automobile Insurance: Exclusion of Coverage for Injuries
to the Insured
There has been a considerable amount of litigation in the
past year involving exclusions of coverage in automobile
liability insurance policies for bodily injuries sustained by
the insured. In Farmers Insurance Exchange v. Frederick,5
Farmers insured a pickup truck owned by Frederick. The
Farmers policy afforded coverage for bodily injury liability
to any person, arising out of the ownership, use, operation,
and control of the described vehicle. The policy further provided that coverage did not apply "to bodily injury to the
insured or any member of the family of the insured residing
in the same household as the insured."6 The policy defined
the word "insured" to include "the named insured and his
relatives"7 as well as permissive users. Frederick, the named
insured, was injured while he was an occupant in his pickup
truck at the time it was being operated by a permissive user.
In a two-to-one decision, the Los Angeles Court of Appeal
held that the word "insured" referred to the person who actually drives the vehicle, and consequently, the exclusion did
not prevent the named insured, Frederick, from recovering
against a permissive user afforded coverage by the terms of
the policy. In an excellent dissent, Justice Herndon pointed
out that the exclusion utilized essentially the same terminology
found in California Vehicle Code section 16454, which
provides, "Any motor vehicle liability policy need not cover
any liability for injury to the assured.
." He further
argued that the majority's construction of the term "insured"
(to mean the driver) was senseless, since no exclusion under
5. 244 Cal. App.2d 776, 53 Cal. Rptr.
457 (1966).
6. 244 Cal. App.2d at 779, 53 Cal.
Rptr. at 458.

7. 244 Cal. App.2d at 779, 53 Cal.
Rptr. at 458.
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a liability policy is required to prevent a person from seeking
to establish his own liability for his own injuries. Both the
majority and the dissent recognized that California law provides that a motor vehicle policy need not cover any liability
for injury to the insured.
Since the Frederick decision, the court of appeal has given
effect to the exclusion in three cases. In Farmers Insurance
Exchange v. Geyer,S the court applied the exclusion with
respect to a claim for injuries made by the named insured,
holding that Vehicle Code section 16454 specifically authorizes the unqualified exclusion of coverage for injuries to the
assured, and a policy that excludes coverage to the named
insured is proper and must be applied. In Farmers Insurance
Exchange v. Brown,9 the policy provided that it did not apply
to the liability of any insured for bodily injury to the named
insured and defined the term "named insured" to include a
spouse of the policyholder if a resident of the same household.
Mr. Brown was the named insured, and Mrs. Brown was
fatally injured while riding in her husband's car. The court
held that Mrs. Brown was a "named insured" under the policy, that the exclusion was valid and operated so as to preclude
coverage for the claims of her heirs for her wrongful death.
Finally, in Hale v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
Company/o which involved a collision between husband and
wife driving the two family automobiles, the court held that
the claim of the wife against her husband for her own injuries
was excluded from the policy issued on the car driven by
the husband. It also rejected the wife's uninsured motorist
claim, since under both the policy definitions and California
Insurance Code section 11580.2,11 a vehicle owned by the
named insured or any resident of the same household does not
qualify as an "uninsured motor vehicle."
8. 247 Cal. App.2d 625, 55 Cal. Rptr.
861 (1967).
9. 252 Cal. App.2d 120, 60 Cal. Rptr.
1 (1967).
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10. 256 Cal. App.2d 206, 63 Cal.
Rptr. 819 (1967).
11. See 256 Cal. App.2d at 210, n. 4,
63 Cal. Rptr. at 822-23, n. 4.
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Uninsured Motorist Coverage
Uninsured motorist coverage was responsible for more decisions in 1967 than any other area of insurance law. In Katz
v. American Motorist Insurance Company/2 the court held
that where an automobile is insured but the insurer has become
insolvent after the accident, the automobile is an "uninsured
motor vehicle" within the meaning of Insurance Code section
11580.2. The effect of this decision has subsequently been
modified by the amendment of section 11580.2 to provide
that the solvency protection under uninsured motorist coverage
is applicable only to accidents occurring during a policy
period in which the insured's motor vehicle coverage is in
effect and where the liability insurer of the tortfeasor becomes
insolvent within 1 year of such accident.
Another recent decision has affirmed the proposition that
California has a statutory policy of uninsured motorist coverage and that deviations from the provisions contained in the
statute will not be permitted. In Lopez v. State Farm Fire
and Casualty Company/3 the policy contained a provision
excluding from uninsured motorist coverage a relative who
owns an automobile. The court held this provision to be
void as conflicting with the applicable statute and stated that
the argument that it was reasonable to exclude one who did
not insure his own car "would better be addressed to the Legislature."
Several cases were decided involving the I-year statute of
limitations set forth in California Insurance Code section
11580.2(h)14 for uninsured motorist claims. In Pacific Indemnity Company v. Superior Court16 and Republic Indemnity
12. 244 Cal. App.2d 886, 53 Cal.
Rptr. 669 (1966).
13. 250 Cal. App.2d 210, 58 Cal.
Rptr. 243 (1967).
14. Cal. Ins. Code § 11580.2(h):
"Prerequisites to suit. No cause of action shall accrue to the insured under
any policy or endorsement provision issued pursuant to this section unless within one year from the date of the accident:

(1) Suit for bodily injury has been
filed against the uninsured motorist, in
a court of competent jurisdiction, or
(2) Agreement as to the amount due
under the policy has been concluded, or
(3) The insured has formally instituted arbitration proceedings."

15. 246 Cal. App.2d 63, 54 Cal. Rptr.
470 (1966).
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Company of America v. Barn Furniture Mart, Inc./ 6 it was
held that the statute of limitations for uninsured motorist
claims is not affected by those disabilities, such as minority
and insanity, that toll other periods of limitation. The statute
of limitations, moreover, is a matter for the court rather than
the arbitrators provided for under the statute; and it has been
held error for the trial court to refuse to enjoin a claimant
from proceeding to arbitration, where it was clear that no
demand to arbitrate had been made within 1 year from the
date of the accident. I7 However, where the claimant sent a
letter to defendant demanding coverage and filed an action
for declaratory relief to determine coverage within 1 year
from the date of the accident, she was held to have complied
with the statute of limitations requirement of formally instituting arbitration proceedings within 1 year from the date
of the accident. Is
Finally, in Fireman's Insurance Company v. Diskin,19
where the tortfeasor's insurer became insolvent more than
1 year after the date of the accident, it was held that the
failure of the claimants either to sue the tortfeasor or to
institute arbitration proceedings within 1 year from the date
of the accident barred their claims, despite the fact that the
accident happened in a state which had a 4-year statute of
limitations period for suits for personal injuries.

Reimbursement for Medical Services From Proceeds of Personal Injury Action
One of the most frequent criticisms aimed at the traditional system of handling automobile accident cases today
is that some people collect twice or even three times for
their medical expenses while others do not recover at all.
Multiple recovery of the same bills is permitted under the
collateral source rule and the refusal to permit subrogation
to medical payments insurers. In Peller v. Liberty Mutual
16. 248 Cal. App.2d 517, 56 Cal.
Rptr. 609 (1967).
17. See Key Ins. Exch. v. Bragini,
250 Cal. App.2d 143, 58 Cal. Rptr. 408
(1967).
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18. See Calhoun v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., 254 Cal. App.2d 441, 62
Cal. Rptr. 177 (1967).
19. 255 Cal. App.2d 598, 63 Cal.
Rptr. 177 (967),
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Insurance Company,20 it was held that an automobile insurer
which had paid out, under the medical payments provision
of its policy, was not entitled to subrogate for those payments
against the tortfeasor. One of the most significant decisions
in the past year may turn out to be the case of Block v.
California Physicians' Service,l where California Physicians'
Service was held entitled to be reimbursed from the proceeds
of a personal injury action filed by the plaintiff for the medical
services which California Physicians' Service had already furnished to the plaintiff. The court held that the group service
agreement, which provided that the member would reimburse
California Physicians' Service to the extent of the benefits
conferred, and granted a lien to the extent of the benefits,
where the member was injured through the act or omission
of another person, was valid and in conformity with public
policy. The court held that this was not a subrogation or
assignment of a personal injury cause of action, since California Physicians' Service had no rights as against the thirdparty tortfeasor, but merely a contractual right against the
member should he recover. The court noted that California
Physicians' Service is a nonprofit enterprise sanctioned by the
legislature for the purpose of providing medical service at
minimal cost; and it held that the plaintiff should not be
allowed a double recovery at the eventual cost to the other
participating members.
It is not clear whether the result in the Block case will
apply to organizations other than nonprofit corporations incorporated under California Corporations Code section 920l.
However, the writer believes that if we are to change our
present system so as to ensure the payment of medical bills
incurred by injured victims of automobile accidents, an integral part of the change in our system will have to be the
abolition of the collateral source rule and the adoption of a
rule that will permit subrogation by medical payments carriers.
20. 220 Cal. App.2d 610, 34 Cal.
Rptr. 41 (1963).
10
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1. 244 Cal. App.2d 266, 53 Cal. Rptr.
51 (1966).
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Conclusion
The cases decided in the past year demonstrate the need for
greater consideration by insurers of the interests and rights of
their insureds and greater understanding on the part of the
courts of the problems faced by insurers. The field of liability
insurance is a business; for each extension of coverage and
broadening of liability, there is a price that the public must
pay. If the insurer is required to defend, afford coverage
for, and settle within limits, lawsuits not within the anticipated scope of the policy against its insureds, we shall either
have to foresake our traditional system of tort compensation
(which the writer certainly does not advocate) or pay an
ever-increasing amount in premium dollars to cover the cost
of these expanding rules of law. If homeowners' policies are
to become automobile policies through transformation at the
hands of the courts, the companies will either have to eliminate automobile coverage entirely or charge a premium that
is commensurate with the additional risk imposed by the
courts.
In its idealism and desire to protect the individual against
the corporate entity, the courts have adopted new concepts
and rules which have been painted on with a broad and
sweeping brush. While change may be desirable and even
necessary, certainty and stability are also important. It is
only by having and maintaining rules that are fair to the
insurer as well as to the insured, to the defendant as well as
to the plaintiff, that we can best secure and protect the
interests of the public and guarantee equal justice to all.
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